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But as precedents survive like the clavicle in the cat, long 
after the use they once served is at an end, and the reason 
for them has been forgotten, the result of following them 
must often be failure and confusion from the merely logical 
point of view.1 
 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.  
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1 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Common Carriers and the Common Law, 13 AM. L. REV. 608, 
630 (1879). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] It can be said, without hyperbole, that the data swell of the last two 
decades catalyzed a seismic shift in the constitution of discoverable 
information in civil litigation.  The volcanic rise of the data labyrinth 
dramatically affected our culture, and has produced critical impacts on the 
legal rights of individuals and organization, as well as on the legal system 
as a whole.2  In the wake of exponential data growth, e-Discovery case 
law materialized in fits and starts3 and only began to coalesce by the early 
                                                          
2 The advent of social media networking alone has dramatically changed the way that 
individuals and companies communicate, and thus create ESI.  Facebook has grown from 
12,000,000 users in 2006 to over a billion in 2012; Twitter had a mere 1,000 users in 
2006, but by 2012 had nearly half a billion.  Pintrest saw a compound annual growth rate 
of 4,900 from 2010 (10,000 users) to 2012 (25,000,000 users).  See D. Steven White, 
Social Media Growth 2006 to 2012, ALL THINGS MARKETING (Feb. 9, 2013), 
http://dstevenwhite.com/2013/02/09/social-media-growth-2006-to-2012/.  
 
3 See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 113 (2d Cir. 
2002) (finding that spoliation sanctions may be imposed for the negligent, gross 
negligent, or bad faith destruction of discoverable information); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 212 
F.R.D. 33, 34, 37 (D.D.C. 2003) (denying further discovery after analysis of a single 
backup did not yield valuable discoverable information); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC 
(Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 218-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that responsive e-mail 
should be produced, even if on backup tapes, and that compelling the responding party to 
restore and produce responsive documents from only a minimal sample of the requested 
backup tapes is, in general, sensible); Tulip Computers Int’l B.V. v. Dell Computer 
Corp., No. 00-981-RRM, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7792, at *11, *16, *19-20 (D. Del. Apr. 
30, 2002) (granting order to compel defendant to provide the computer hard drives 
utilized by specific company executives for key word searching after defendant failed to 
answer various discovery); Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 650-
52 (D. Minn. 2002) (finding that discoverable and relevant information could be found in 
deleted documents residing on defendant’s computer systems and that it was reasonable 
for plaintiff to attempt to recover such information); Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 
F.R.D. 277, 289-90 (E.D. Va. 2001) (finding draft reports and communications between 
defendant’s litigation support company and third-party expert were discoverable and the 
destruction of same was spoliation); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 
1054 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (finding that production of employee hard drives was not unduly 
burdensome where defendant’s employees deleted relevant e-mail during the course of 
litigation); Dodge, Warren, & Peters Ins. Servs. v. Riley, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 385, 388-89 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (granting a preliminary injunction against defendants in a 
misappropriation of trade secrets case and ordering them to preserve electronic evidence 
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2000s in district court orders and opinions that focused on a party’s duty 
to preserve unique relevant information, such as electronically stored 
information (“ESI”) and sanctions that followed insufficient efforts to 
preserve ESI.4     
 
[2] While case law of the burgeoning electronic age provided nascent 
pathways for e-Discovery, the decisions were, by their nature, based upon 
rudimentary assumptions regarding the character of ESI.  Moreover, the 
decisions are inevitably related to the unique technologies at issue in each 
case.  As such, the seminal e-Discovery cases largely focused on issues 
such as “PROFS” mail5 and magnetic media backup tapes.6  At that time, 
approximately in the early 1990s and early 2000s, smartphones had yet to 
emerge,7 Facebook was still the idea of a college student at Harvard, a 
tweet was merely a sound that a bird made, and cloud computing had not 
been rolled out to individuals and small businesses.   
 
                                                                                                                                                
and appointing an expert to recover lost or deleted files, copy data, and perform key word 
searches). 
 
4 See Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 113; Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 
V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Thompson v. United States HUD, 219 F.R.D. 
93, 104-05 (D. Md. 2003); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 19128, at *18-21, *26 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2003). 
 
5 See Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1278-80 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(challenging the proposed destruction of certain federal records, and referred to 
colloquially as the PROFS case, taking its name from the IBM PROFS (Professional 
Office System) e-mail system used in the White House). 
 
6 See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (evaluating the burden for each defendant to produce e-mail based, in part, upon 
whether the e-mail was stored on backup tapes). 
 
7 The PalmOne Treo 600 and the BlackBerry were introduced to the market in 2003.  See 
The Evolution of Cell Phone Design Between 1983-2009, WEBDESIGNER DEPOT (May 22, 
2009), http://www.webdesignerdepot.com/2009/05/the-evolution-of-cell-phone-design-
between-1983-2009/. 
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[3] As many have noted, technology has continued its rapid expanse 
over the past ten years;8 the law, however, fails to adequately address the 
increasingly advanced and often complex technologies, as it lumbers 
behind the pace of innovation.  But what of that fact?  How is a 
practitioner to take that piece of information and use it to better her 
practice, improve her skill, and serve as a superior advocate for her 
clients?  The authors of this Article have observed that the collision 
between the measured evolution of law under stare decisis and precipitous 
changes in technology has yielded assumptions, or legal myths, that shade 
legal decisions long after the initial supposition has been debunked, 
undermined, or rendered irrelevant.  Indeed, many contemporary judicial 
decisions rely on this historic body of e-Discovery folklore, 
notwithstanding the facts of ESI as they now exist.  Recognizing the 
treacherous nature of relying on prior cases in the area of e-Discovery is a 
critical skill for today’s litigators. 
 
[4] This Article seeks to 1) identify select examples of “old world” 
assumptions, 2) demonstrate how new technologies confound these initial 
assumptions when it comes to e-Discovery, and 3) offer practitioners “best 
practices” advice on how to avoid the pitfalls of relying on outdated 
assumptions in e-Discovery practice.  We start with a review of stare 
decisis’ role in American Jurisprudence, and follow with a discussion of 
the evolution of e-Discovery case law and the nature of technological 
change.  We then examine five assumptions that exist within the e-
Discovery domain. 
 
 A.  The Role and Value of Stare Decisis in e-Discovery 
 
[5] Stare decisis is a foundational principle of the common law system 
of American Jurisprudence.9  As translated from Latin, stare decisis means 
                                                          
8 See, e.g., Vivek Wadhwa, Why I Believe That This Will Be the Most Innovative Decade 
in History, FORBES (June 25, 2012, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/singularity/2012/06/25/most-innovative-decade-in-history/. 
 
9 Todd E. Freed, Is Stare Decisis Still the Lighthouse Beacon of Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence?: A Critical Analysis, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1767, 1767 n.3 (1996). 
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“to stand by things decided.”10  It is a legal principle of two parts: (1) that 
trial courts have to honor the precedents of higher courts,11 and (2) that the 
Supreme Court of the United States must follow its own precedents.12  
Thus, trial courts have an obligation to follow the precedent of higher 
appellate courts, but opinions of other trial courts hold only persuasive 
authority.13  Against this background it is important to note that because 
discovery disputes are a matter for trial courts, and opinions and orders on 
discovery matters are interlocutory in nature, few cases have been 
reviewed by appellate courts.  Thus, issues in e-Discovery have been 
largely handled on a case-by-case basis, with little in the way of guiding 
precedent.  It is true that the legal rules that guide discovery can be applied 
to ESI in a general fashion (e-Discovery is, in fact, merely discovery); in 
order to adequately execute such discovery, however, attorneys and judges 
must understand the technical underpinnings of relevant data and the 
practical results of applying the rules to specific technology.  Thus, stare 
decisis has built, at best, only a skeletal framework for discovery, and is 
devoid of a legal blueprint that  practitioners  may  follow as they execute 
discovery in the digital age.  Moreover, the demands of properly 
describing and executing e-Discovery can require greater time and 
resources than are available to the average litigator or court.  As a result, it 
is easy to rely, reflexively, upon prior opinions to try and solve a current 
problem, even when the factual comparison is inapt. 
 
B.  The Challenge of Ever-Evolving ESI to the Reasoned 
Development of Case Law 
 
[6] Computers have been used in the context of business since the 
1950s, but the volume of ESI created by early computer systems was 
                                                          
10 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009). 
 
11 This is known as “vertical stare decisis.”  Id.  
 
12 “Horizontal stare decisis” requires a court to follow its past decisions.  Id. 
 
13 See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1174 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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limited.14  With the advent of the personal computer revolution in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the stage was set for an explosion of data.  In the 
1990s, personal “productivity” software such as Lotus 123, WordPerfect, 
and the Microsoft Office suite of programs became commonplace in 
corporate organizations, displacing reliance on mainframe and mini-frame 
computing systems.15  At the same time, the ubiquity of e-mail in personal 
and business communications began to rapidly dwarf traditional methods 
of written correspondence; since 2000 the United States Postal Service has 
experienced a significant decline in volume of mail handled and now 
handles fewer letters and packages each year than the number of e-mails 
sent each day.16  The travail left to courts in the face of these new 
technologies, and vast cultural shift in communicative behavior, was 
significant.  During that time a great number of parties were reluctant to 
even produce ESI.  Amid this uncertainty, in 1995 Magistrate Judge Peck 
issued an opinion and order regarding the discovery of “data processing 
files” that famously pronounced that “today it is black letter law that 
computerized data is discoverable if relevant.”17   
 
[7] By the early 2000s, the Internet was a dominant global 
communication medium, which in turn spawned the social media 
revolution, as well as the ability to use massive computing resources on a 
collective basis (through what we commonly refer to as “cloud 
computing”).  Additionally, more individuals started using phones for 
messaging and the forerunners of today’s smart phones, such as the Palm 
Treo and early Blackberry models, began to merge phone and messaging 
                                                          
14 See PETER J. BIRD, LEO: THE FIRST BUSINESS COMPUTER 15 (1994). 
 
15 See Darryl K. Taft, eWeek at 30:  How Microsoft Won the 1990s Office Suite Wars, 
EWEEK (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.eweek.com/enterprise-apps/eweek-at-30-how-
microsoft-won-the-1990s-office-suite-wars.html/. 
 
16 NORMAN J. MEDOFF & BARBARA K. KAYE, ELECTRONIC MEDIA:  THEN, NOW, AND 
LATER 80 (2d ed. 2011). 
 
17 Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2120, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16355, 
at *1, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995). 
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capabilities with enhanced features and qualities.18  Moreover, the reduced 
expense of audio and video transmission devices allowed for the 
incredible generation and retention of voice and image recordings across a 
plethora of devices and platforms.19    
 
[8] In light of the variety of forms ESI may take,20 prior to the 200621 
it was unclear whether all ESI met the definition of discoverable 
“documents” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 34.22  
Debates regarding the discoverability of metadata arose before the 2006 
change to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and continued thereafter.23  
The Federal Rules continue to “chase” ESI technology, and proposed 
                                                          
18 See Julie Strietelmeir, Handspring Treo 180 Review, THE GADGETEER (Mar. 12, 2002, 
12:00 AM), http://the-gadgeteer.com/2002/03/12/handspring_treo_180_review/.  
 
19 See Jarad Carleton, FROST & SULLIVAN, VIDEO & VOICE ARCHIVING 3, available at 
http://china.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/csg4870-video-voice-archiving-ar.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
 
20 ESI can take the form of a word processing document, a file that appears to the user in 
a form similar to a paper document, but it also takes the form of deleted information in 
slack space, application metadata, and system metadata.  Cf. Thomas Y. Allman, 
Managing Preservation Obligations After the 2006 Federal e-Discovery Amendments, 13 
RICH. J.L. & TECH 9, ¶ 7 (noting that “some types of ESI [are] not ordinarily visible to a 
user (such as metadata or embedded data)”). 
 
21 From 1970 until the time that Rule 34 was amended in 2006, the Rule allowed for the 
production of “documents” which included “data compilations.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 34 at 
2006 advisory committee’s notes. 
 
22 See Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffery Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil 
Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 347 (2000) (discussing that 
deleted ESI, “embedded data” (i.e. application metadata), and log-on and network data 
(i.e. system metadata) may be relevant discoverable information, but does not fit neatly 
within the definition of documents in the prior version of Rule 34).  
 
23 Compare id., with Lucia Cucu, Note, The Requirement for Metadata Production Under 
Williams v. Sprint/United Management Co.: An Unnecessary Burden for Litigants 
Engaged in Electronic Discovery, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 221-22 (2007) (discussing 
the perceived problems in defining metadata and that over preservation of metadata 
makes preservation and discovery needlessly more costly and difficult). 
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amendments addressing discovery seek to further clarify the place of ESI 
in the Rules’ context.24   
 
[9] This great and terrible assemblage of data—unmatched (and even 
previously unimagined) in the annals of human history—has particular 
import for lawyers charged with its handling, as it is all potentially 
discoverable evidence in the United States.  The trailing case law has tried 
to define the parameters and terms laid out in the Federal Rules, set 
requirements for production and preservation, and create consequences for 
failures by parties to meet the both court-promulgated and rule-derived 
guidelines.  
 
[10] From a sociological perspective, changing technology has also 
contributed profoundly to cultural norms in a way that greatly impacts the 
world of ESI; technology has afforded individuals the means and freedom 
to irreparably blur personal and professional roles and identities.  Today, 
with the development of true “smart phone” devices, the possibilities of 
completely mobile, self-contained personal computing are boundless; 
Android and iOS platforms provide individual users with the genuine and 
nearly unfettered ability to communicate and work from a single, multi-
functional hand-held device.    The idea, and perhaps preferable business 
model, of the separation of roles (and devices) has been largely 
surrendered in favor of the convenience of single-device management.  
The consequences of this shift are significant and undercut many of the 
                                                          
24 Whereas the 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure focused 
principally on “e-Discovery,” the 2013 proposals aim to reform discovery in general; the 
core theme that animates the 2013 proposals is the need to reduce the burdens of modern 
discovery.  Some of the more significant proposed changes include the statement 
regarding “cooperation” that has been introduced into the committee note for Rule 1 and 
the initial meet and confer required pursuant to Rule 26(f); changes that would limit the 
scope of discovery, including amendment to Rules 26(b), 26(c), 30, 31, 33, and 36; and 
the new spoliation sanctions rule in the proposed Rule 37(e).  See COMM. ON RULES OF 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONF., 113TH CONG., PRELIMINARY DRAFT 
OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY AND CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 281, 281, 289-93, 296, 300-05, 310-11, 314-17 (Comm. Print 2013), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/preliminary-draft-proposed-
amendments.pdf [hereinafter “PRELIMINARY DRAFT AMENDMENTS”]. 
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longstanding assumptions anchoring stare decisis in the context of e-
Discovery. 
 
[11] In some instances, courts are forced to make decisions on e-
Discovery issues based on the arguments and best evidence before them, 
and issue orders that are almost immediately obsolete or are simply 
misguided when considered in light of the totality of the technological 
facts of a specific issue and the potential wide-spread ramifications of 
even a seemingly narrow ruling in a single case.  For example, in National 
Day Laborer Organizing Network v. United States Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement Agency, Judge Scheindlin, one of the best known 
and most learned judges on this topic, originally ruled that the federal 
government must include certain “key” metadata fields when producing 
electronic data that is maintained by the agency as part of the electronic 
record when responding to Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) 
requests. 25  Amidst much hue and cry by the government Judge 
Scheindlin withdrew her opinion, stating that based upon later submissions 
on the issue the “decision was not based on a full and developed record.”26  
The judge further specified that the previous “decision [would hold] no 
precedential value.”27   
 
[12] National Day Laborer serves as a stark example of the problem 
facing litigants and courts.  Judge Scheindlin was acutely aware of the 
need for concrete and practical guidance, and her efforts to set forth rules 
of the road in the FOIA context was clearly intended to also guide civil 
litigants.28   Despite this admirable goal, however, briefing by the parties 
                                                          
25 Opinion and Order, Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. United States Immigration & 
Custody Enforcement Agency, No. 10 Civ. 3488 (SAS), 17-18 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2011), 
ECF No. 41, withdrawn, Order Withdrawing Opinion, Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network 
v. United States Immigration & Custody Enforcement Agency, No. 10 Civ. 3488 (SAS) 
(S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2011), ECF No. 98. 
 
26 Order Withdrawing Opinion, supra note 25. 
 
27 Id. 
 
28 See Order and Opinion, supra note 25, at 7, 11, 15-16, 24. 
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left the court with an incomplete record of the technical considerations 
that ultimately undercut the validity and viability of the proposed 
guidance.29   Simply put, courts are in the unenviable position of either 
applying stare decisis, using the best established law available to decide 
issues related to cutting edge technology (about which they are not subject 
matter experts, relying, in part, on the arguments presents by litigants who 
typically lack such expertise as well), or must evade important issues as 
they arise.  It is within this perfect storm of boundary-pushing technology 
and chasing jurisprudence that fallacious assumptions about ESI and e-
Discovery arose, became ingrained, and now subtly work to undermine the 
emergence of a cohesive body of law for resolving e-Discovery disputes. 
 
[13] What follows is an examination of select e-Discovery myths and 
assumptions that serve to extend this schism between law and reality.  We 
present the origins of each assumption and discuss how each became a 
part of the precedential history guiding courts and practitioners today.  We 
then attempt to demonstrate why these assumptions embedded in our law 
must be approached with caution and skepticism.  Finally, we provide 
guidance regarding best practices for addressing these complex issues in 
litigation.  In the end, and perhaps not surprisingly, we conclude that stare 
decisis will likely never develop to guide e-Discovery in the ways in 
which it may have developed for other species of legal disputes of 
substantive or procedural origin. 
 
                                                          
29 See Order Withdrawing Opinion, supra note 25; supra text accompanying notes 26-27. 
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II.  EXEMPLAR DECISIONS REFLECTING THE TRIUMPH OF SWIFT 
TECHNOLOGY EVOLUTIONS OVER THE ILLUSIVE QUEST FOR JUDICIAL 
GUIDANCE IN E-DISCOVERY 
 
A.  Case Assumption #1: The Defining Issue for Discoverability 
of Relevant Electronic Information Is Accessibility. 
 
Truth:  Accessibility changes with technologies; the key is proportionality 
in the requirements of production. 
 
[14] In early ESI decisions, such as Residential Funding Corp. v. 
DeGeorge Financial Corp., Zubulake IV, Thompson v. United States 
HUD, and McPeek v. Ashcroft,30 there was an implicit, if not explicit, 
focus on whether a source of ESI was “accessible.”  If it was determined, 
in fact, that the requested information existed, even in a form that required 
“restoration,” and could therefore be accessed, courts were likely to allow 
at least some sampling of the restored data to see what might be found.31  
Oftentimes the legal analysis and inquiries focused on the retrieval of 
information from magnetic media backup tapes.  Indeed, the notoriety 
surrounding such inquiries led the Civil Rules Advisory Committee to 
recommend, and the Supreme Court to adopt, a specific provision in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to address sources of ESI that are “not 
reasonably accessible.”32    
 
[15] The logic of this initial focus on accessibility is inescapable.  In the 
early days of the explosion of data creation and storage, technological 
innovations had not yet fixed on the back-end solutions of managing what 
was being created and stored at such a feverish pace.  Thus, the question 
                                                          
30 Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp, 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002); 
Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Thompson v. United States HUD, 219 
F.R.D 93 (D. Md. 2003); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 
31 Judge Facciola described one such foray into the complexities of data retrieval as a 
“test run.”  McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 34. 
 
32 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
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of accessibility became the natural linchpin in determining whether certain 
data could be “discovered” at all.  This seeming “bright line” also 
appeared as a visage of hope in the effort to reign in potentially 
unbounded discovery of oceans of data.  However, conflating the concepts 
of accessibility and discoverability did not serve the law well when 
technology broke through most of the barriers to accessibility present in 
early cases. 
 
[16] In practical terms, the speed of technology left these past cases and 
even the Rule 26(b)(2)(B) “not reasonably accessible” test in the dustbin 
of history as many organizations no longer use magnetic media back-up 
tapes (having been replaced with mirrored servers or cloud storage for 
disaster recovery) and a number of vendors have developed solutions to 
more easily and less expensively access data on magnetic media back-up 
tapes.  These developments render a focus on “accessibility” moot 
inasmuch as the issue does not help to frame the boundaries of discovery. 
 
[17] Courts have said, primarily in dicta, that data preservation does not 
require Herculean efforts to maintain the universe of “preservable” data.33  
Unfortunately, the reality is that the underlying assumption of the earliest 
cases was that if information was “accessible” then it could be 
discoverable—without regard to the reality that new technologies would 
provide an unmanageable ocean of data that could threaten to swallow 
civil discovery.34  This reality has been hammered home in recent years by 
the Duke Conference Subcommittee and the Discovery Subcommittee of 
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, which have each concluded that 
proportionality is one of the most important (but often overlooked) tenants 
that must be used to guide the scope of discovery.35   
                                                          
33 See Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217. 
 
34 See Rachel K. Alexander, E-Discovery Practice, Theory, and Precedent: Finding the 
Right Pond, Lure, and Lines without Going on a Fishing Expedition, 56 S.D. L. REV. 25, 
26-27 (2011). 
 
35 See generally Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell, Chairman, Advisory 
Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Standing 
Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 8, 2013), available at 
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[18] In short, the breadth of “accessible information” dwarfs the needs 
of most any case.  We as practitioners must not start by requesting the 
entire universe of potentially relevant data wholesale, but begin to focus 
on the discoverable information that is really needed and is proportional to 
the case.  This requires little more than an exercise in textbook discovery 
practice.  In order to conceive and craft narrowly drawn discovery requests 
that are intended to elicit unique relevant data that makes an element of 
the case we are pressing more or less likely, attorneys and clients must 
know and understand their cases to the extent practicable.  This shift in 
practice requires restraint.  It requires the practitioner to ignore the 
historical norms of engaging in haphazard free-for-all discovery grabs, 
which inevitably lead back to disputes about accessibility, rather than 
critical import.  It requires reasonable cooperation between the parties to 
identify, first, what data and material each party really is seeking, and 
second, the best means for the production of information that is accessible 
and proportional to the case.  It may even require greater judicial 
involvement to make proportionality a reality.  Ironically, in Judge 
Scheindlin’s conclusion in the now-withdrawn opinion of National Day 
Laborer, she eloquently made this very point: 
 
Once again, this Court is required to rule on an e-discovery 
issue that could have been avoided had the parties had the 
good sense to “meet and confer,” “cooperate” and generally 
make every effort to “communicate” as to the form in 
which the ESI would be produced.  The quoted words are 
found in opinion after opinion and yet lawyers fail to take 
the necessary steps to fulfill their obligations to each other 
and the court . . . [S]uch conduct certainly shows that all 
lawyers—even highly respected private lawyers, 
Government lawyers, and professors of law—need to make 
greater efforts to comply with the expectations that courts 
                                                                                                                                                
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-2013.pdf 
(reporting on the advisory committee notes on proposed amendments to the Rules from a 
meeting at the University of Oklahoma and discussing a similar conference in 2010 at 
Duke University). 
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now demand of counsel with respect to expensive and time-
consuming document production.  Lawyers are all too 
ready to point the finger at the courts and the Rules for 
increasing the expense of litigation, but that expense could 
be greatly diminished if lawyers met their own obligations 
to ensure that document production is handled as 
expeditiously and inexpensively as possible.  This can only 
be achieved through cooperation and communication.36   
 
[19] In practice, counsel, whether requesting discovery or responding to 
discovery requests, must tie proportionality to the pedestal of relevance.  
Indeed, oft-ignored Rule 26(g) requires that attorneys certify that 
discovery is being conceived and executed in a proportional fashion.37  In 
addition to raising the issue of proportionality, wise counsel will 
specifically analyze the discovery requests at a micro-level, determining 
whether the specific deposition, computer recovery, or interrogatory is 
“worth the candle” when propounding discovery.  Next, counsel must 
present concrete examples and evidence of the need or burden associated 
with the discovery request.  Generalized statements about the size of a 
case or unsubstantiated notions of burden should be, and will be, quickly 
discarded by the court.  Finally, wise counsel should actively engage their 
adversary in dialogue and, if that proves unsuccessful, walk into court 
with a singular focus of presenting the more reasonable—and 
proportionate—approach to the discovery dispute. 
 
                                                          
36 Order and Opinion, supra note 25, at 25. 
 
37 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g). 
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B.  Case Assumption #2: Possession, Custody, or Control Is an 
Effective Way to Establish the Scope of Discovery for Relevant 
Electronic Information. 
 
Truth:  The emergence of a blended world of personal and business 
information on devices and in the cloud confounds the usefulness of the 
traditional test. 
 
[20] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 has always provided that 
parties have a duty to produce discoverable information that is within their 
“possession, custody, or control.”38  Early case law in the area of 
discovery clearly established that the standard is disjunctive; that is, the 
party must not only produce discoverable information in its possession, 
but also such information that is merely within its control.39  Nonetheless, 
                                                          
38 In 1936 the text of Rule 34 read: 
 
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice 
to all other parties, the court in which an action is pending may (1) 
order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or 
photographing by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated 
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or 
tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence 
material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his 
possession custody, or control; or (2) order any party to permit entry 
upon designated land or other property in his possession or control for 
the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the 
property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon.  The 
order shall specify the time, place, and manner of making the 
inspection and taking the copies and photographs and may prescribe 
such terms and conditions as are just.  
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 was amended in 1946, 1970, 1980, 1987, 1991, 1993, 
2006, and 2007.  In August 2013, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of 
the Judicial Conference of the United States released for public comment proposed 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 34.  If adopted, the 
proposed amendment to Rule 34 would amend procedures regarding responses and 
objections to requests for production governed by Rule 34(b)(2).  See PRELIMINARY 
DRAFT AMENDMENTS, supra note 24, at 306-08. 
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while many cases parrot the test and existing precedent, there is little 
discussion in such cases regarding the distinction between possession and 
custody versus control.40 
 
[21] In the modern era of discovery, disputes regarding whether 
evidence is within a litigant’s possession or custody are dispatched with 
relative ease,41 but the issue of control has been frequently and fervently 
                                                                                                                                                
39 See, e.g., Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Staley, 4 F.R.D. 333, 335-36 (W.D. Pa. 1945) 
(finding that a moving party must at a minimum aver that documents are in the control of 
the plaintiff) (emphasis added); United Mercantile Agencies v. Silver Fleet Motor 
Express, 1 F.R.D. 709, 712 (W.D. Ky. 1941) (finding that business documents of 
defendant are within its possession, custody, or control, if “defendant would either have 
actual physical possession of its own records or would be in a position to obtain them 
from someone who has temporary custody of them.”) (emphasis added).  Moreover, 
possession, custody, or control is a legal standard that pre-dates the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  See Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical 
Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 332-33 (1988).  The 
Field Code contained provision regarding the inspection and copying of papers in the 
possession or custody of the opposition.  See id. at 332.  In addition, the concept of 
possession, custody, and control is not unique to discovery law.  For example, the same 
concept can be found in criminal law, bankruptcy law, and in the law applicable to estates 
and trusts.  See, e.g., Wilson v United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377 (1911) (finding that the 
president of a corporation could be personally held in contempt of court for failure to 
produce letters he wrote in his capacity as president to the grand jury because a subpoena 
was properly served upon the corporation, and the letters were documentary property 
subject to the control of the corporation); Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 185 (2d 
Cir. 1959); Van Antwerp v. Hulburd, 28 F. Cas. 941, 942-43 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1871) 
(finding that bonds that were allegedly taken into receivership and paid to the federal 
government under a bank liquidation were not in the possession, custody, or control of 
the receiver, his duties being limited by statute). 
 
40 See, e.g., Garrett v. Faust, 7 F.R.D. 650, 651 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (failing to differentiate 
among “possession, custody, or control”); Thomas French & Sons, Ltd. v. Carleton 
Venetian Blind Co., 30 F. Supp. 903, 905 (E.D.N.Y. 1939). 
 
41 Where possession is the issue, the court has little need to provide findings or analysis 
beyond the fact that the item in question is or is not in the party’s possession.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Int'l Union of Petroleum & Indus. Workers, 870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th 
Cir. 1989). 
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litigated.42  Courts presume that “records which are normally kept in the 
business of the party . . . are presumed to exist, absent a sworn denial, and 
a prima facie case of control is all that must be established to justify 
issuance of the order.”43  While it is clear that control constitutes more 
than the ability to obtain discoverable information, the definition of 
control varies by jurisdiction.44 In some jurisdictions, such as the Ninth 
Circuit, control is defined as the legal right to obtain discoverable 
information.45  Other courts have found that control exists where a party 
has “the right, authority, or practical ability[] to obtain the documents 
from a non-party to the action.”46   
 
[22] While these standards are not always black and white, they are 
relatively simple to apply to paper documents, physical evidence, or even 
data on servers owned and operated by a business.  This was true of the 
backup tapes in McPeek, the e-mail at issue in Zubulake IV, and the data in 
the off-site warehouse in Tulip Computers International B.V. v. Dell 
Computer Corporation.47  When a device is used for a mix of personal and 
business purposes, however, and particularly when a business allows an 
employee to use technologies and devices that are not owned by the 
                                                          
42 See, e.g., Bough v. Lee, 29 F. Supp. 498, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). 
 
43 Norman v. Young, 422 F.2d 470, 473 (10th Cir. 1970) (citations omitted); see also 
Mullen v. Mullen, 14 F.R.D. 142, 143 (D. Alaska 1953) (requiring that defendant trustee 
produce tax returns of the trust because “[n]ot only is the state of the record such as to 
warrant the inference of possession, custody or control, but there is no denial thereof”). 
 
44 See Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1427 (7th Cir. 1993) (“But the 
fact that a party could obtain a document if it tried hard enough . . . does not mean that 
the document is in its possession, custody, or control.”). 
 
45 See In re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d 1090, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 
46 Prokosch v. Catalina Lighting, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 633, 636 (D. Minn. 2000) (quoting 
Bank of N.Y. v. Meridien Biao Bank Tanz., Ltd., 171 F.R.D. 135, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). 
 
47 McPeek v. Ashcroft, 212 F.R.D. 33, 35 (D.D.C. 2003); Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 
216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Tulip Computers Int'l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., No. 00-981-
RRM, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7792, at *5 (D. Del. April 30, 2002). 
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organization48 in the course of employment, issues of control between 
employer and employee49 or a business and its business partner can 
arise.50  Because technologies are no longer tethered to an office or a 
home base, the ESI is not necessarily within the possession or custody of 
the business.  Likewise, the widespread availability of computing 
resources and ubiquitous Internet connectivity has led to a world where 
multiple organizations may share common access to data platforms and 
systems, while little or no consideration is given to data security or control 
rights.  These trends trigger questions of control in a new light.51 
 
[23] Aptly illustrating this point is Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics, Inc. 
In Carrillo, the defendant organization was sanctioned when it failed to 
produce e-mail authored by its employees using the e-mail facilities of its 
business partner.52  The court rejected the organization’s claim that it did 
not control the e-mail because it did not own the e-mail servers.53  In 
2013, a similar e-mail issue arose in Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. v. Kozumi 
                                                          
48 Such as smartphones, tables, and even personal computers. 
 
49 See, e.g., Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 242 F.R.D. 353, 355 (E.D. Va. 2006) (finding that 
the newspaper ceded control of its reporter’s notes and other unpublished materials to the 
employees per the joint bargaining agreement and employee handbook and that the paper 
had no obligation to produce same). 
 
50 See, e.g., Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics, Inc., No. CV 11-8557-CAS (DTBx), 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146903, at *34, *51 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2012) (sanctioning a retail 
distributor for not producing e-mails its employees’ sent using the e-mail system of its 
client, Wal-Mart). 
 
51 Historically issues of control involved issues of non-employee agents of an 
organization or parent-subsidiary corporate relationships.  See, e.g., Caremark, Inc. v. 
Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., 192 F.R.D. 263, 264 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (discussing 
whether the attorney-client privilege applies to a non-employee agent’s communications 
with a corporation’s attorneys); Nears v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 295 
S.W.3d 787 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (determining whether a parent corporation exercised 
sufficient control over an individual employee to implicate liability in a tort claim). 
 
52 See Carrillo, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146903, at *34-35, *51-52. 
 
53 See id. at *34-35. 
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USA Corp., where an individual used a private Gmail account to send 
work related e-mails. 54  In that case, the court found that absent evidence 
that the company had a legal right to the documents contained in the e-
mails, the organization could not be compelled to produce e-mails from 
the private Gmail account because the Gmail account was not in the 
control of the organization.55 
 
[24] Additionally, in Cotton v. Costco Wholesale Corp. the court found 
that Costco did not have control of text messages on its employees 
personal cell phones because there was no evidence “that Costco issued 
the cell phones to these employees, that the employees used the cell 
phones for any work-related purpose, or that Costco otherwise has any 
legal right to obtain employee text messages on demand.”56  In a similar 
case, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas found that 
a board of directors did not have the legal right to demand discoverable 
information from former employees or former board members.57  On the 
other hand, in a 2013 opinion in the Pradaxa litigation, the court 
sanctioned a company for not preserving text messages on all of its 
employees’ mobile devices, including personal devices.58 
 
[25] These cases illustrate the emerging conflict and confluence 
involving data systems and devices.  Moreover, in regard to best practice 
guidance, these disputes make clear that companies must do a better job of 
setting forth clear employment guidelines and enforcing them.  While it 
                                                          
54 See Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. v. Kozumi USA Corp., No. 12-cv-2582 CW (JSC), 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53657, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2013). 
 
55 Id. at *7-8. 
 
56 Cotton v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 12-2731-JWL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103369, 
at *17-18 (D. Kan. July 24, 2013). 
 
57  See Kickapoo Tribe of Indians of Kickapoo Reservation in Kan. v. Nemaha Brown 
Watershed Joint Dist. No. 7, 294 F.R.D. 610, 613-14 (D. Kan. 2013).  
 
58 In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2385; 3:12-md-02385-
DRH-SCW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173647, at *61 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2013).  
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may seem beneficial for an organization to control less discoverable 
information, the lack of control can result in a loss of power and the ability 
to manage discovery.   
 
[26] Finally it is important to note that potential evidence is not 
exempted from discovery merely because it is not within the possession, 
custody, or control of a party.59  When ESI is not within the organization’s 
control, the organization will likely miss the opportunity to review the ESI 
for relevance and privilege.  Thus, an organization may wish to establish 
policies and practices that allow it to work with employees and business 
partners to control ESI so that it can maintain a defensible position as to its 
own organizational control of responsiveness and determinations of 
privilege.  Regardless of the path chosen, however, it is critical that the 
policies are clear and well enforced.  Otherwise, the scope of preservation 
and production obligations will be unclear, and the resolution of disputes 
will be made with little predictability as to the outcome. 
 
C.  Case Assumption #3: Preservation of Electronically Stored 
Information Is Getting Easier with the Passage of Time. 
 
Truth:  Although the capacity for data storage expands, the complexity of 
preservation and retrieval considerations increases concurrently. 
 
[27] The duty to preserve relevant, unique evidence is a well-
established common law doctrine;60 “[t]he common law imposes the 
obligation to preserve evidence from the moment that litigation is 
reasonably anticipated.”61  There is no duty-to-preserve explicitly codified 
                                                          
59 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(b)(1) provides that “[a]ny person who is at least [eighteen] years old 
and not a party may serve a subpoena.”  
 
60 See, e.g., Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 517 n.12 (D. Md. 
2009). 
 
61 Victor Stanley, Inc., v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 521 (D. Md. 2010). 
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in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in current form,62 but the duty has 
long existed as an inherent duty for all parties.63  Courts have relied both 
on their authority under Rule 37 and their inherent powers64 to impose 
sanctions on litigants for failure to preserve and produce evidence in 
accordance with this inherent duty.65 
 
[28] As ESI volumes began to swell, the duty to preserve became an 
increasingly litigated issue.  The early cases that addressed the 
preservation of ESI are deeply rooted in assumptions about data structures 
that are contrary-to-fact when it comes to navigating the obligations and 
burdens of data preservation today.  While the basic doctrine of the 
common law duty to preserve does not deviate significantly from Circuit 
to Circuit, there is wide variation in the standard for imposing sanctions 
for the failure to uphold that duty.  Willful, grossly negligent, or merely 
negligent destruction of documents or data may prompt a court to impose 
spoliation sanctions.66  This uncertainty causes many organizations to 
default to a standard of undifferentiated, wholesale preservation—that is 
the unattainable goal of preserving nearly every “scrap” of evidence.  
 
                                                          
62 In the proposed changes to Rule 37 regarding sanctions, currently under consideration 
by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (the period for public 
comment on these proposed changes ended Feb. 15, 2014), section (e), currently titled 
“Failure to Provide Electronically Stored Information,” would be amended to read 
“Failure to Preserve Discoverable Information,” thus formally incorporating the duty into 
the Rules.  See PRELIMINARY DRAFT AMENDMENTS, supra note 24, at 314. 
 
63 See Goodman, 632 F.Supp. 2d at 505 (quoting Thompson v. United States HUD, 219 
F.R.D. 93, 100 (D. Ms. 2003)); see also Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 
591 (4th Cir. 2001).  
 
64 See Victor Stanley, 269 F.R.D. at 517-18 (quoting Goodman, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 505); 
see also Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F.3d 650, 652 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 
65 See Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 
2002); see also Victor Stanley, 269 F.R.D. at 541. 
 
66 See Victor Stanley, 269 F.R.D. at 529, 532 (detailing different standards used by 
federal courts throughout the country). 
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[29] The underlying assumption perpetuating this preservation myth is 
that the increasingly sophisticated systems controlling the creation and 
storage of ESI allow an organization’s IT department to flip a switch and 
send out an appropriate legal hold to preserve identifiably relevant data.  
During the ongoing saga of the missing, deleted, or withheld e-mails in 
Zubulake, the court summarily restated this basic formulation of a party’s 
duty to preserve:  
 
[O]nce the duty to preserve attaches, counsel must identify 
sources of discoverable information.  This will usually 
entail speaking directly with the key players in the 
litigation, as well as the client’s information technology 
personnel.  In addition, when the duty to preserve attaches, 
counsel must put in place a litigation hold and make that 
known to all relevant employees by communicating with 
them directly.  The litigation hold instructions must be 
reiterated regularly and compliance must be monitored.  
Counsel must also call for employees to produce copies of 
relevant electronic evidence, and must arrange for the 
segregation and safeguarding of any archival media (e.g., 
backup tapes) that the party has a duty to preserve.67 
 
[30] The assumption that all ESI can be preserved generally comes into 
play when litigants argue that the electronic nature of the discoverable 
information makes it infinitely easier for the producing party to comply 
with discovery.  The argument is fatally seductive in its simplicity: “It’s 
just a matter of pushing the right buttons.”  While there may have been 
some validity supporting such a conclusion in the context of Zubulake V, 
there is no question that the utility of this position has been worn thin over 
the past ten years by the vast changes in data volume, data types, and data 
systems that are pervasive in today’s business models.   
 
[31] The preservation myth is fallacious for two major reasons.  First, it 
assumes a certain level of possession, custody, and control based on our 
                                                          
67 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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antiquated notions about where and how data is stored.68 This assumption 
is derived from the false premise that the data ecosystem for any given 
organization is largely an updated, but equivalent, system built and 
organized in the same way that the paper-office organizational system was 
set up and mirrored by the early computer/ESI transition.  The idea that 
current data ecosystems are merely a modern, albeit transformed, version 
of “the paper office” as we know it is simply false.  Second, this 
assumption fails to account for the fact that we are dealing with 
incomparably more data, and with types of data that have never before 
existed before, in any form, in any office.69  
 
[32] The fallacy of regarding electronic offices as high-tech mirrors to 
traditional offices has long been recognized, but persists nonetheless.  As 
early as 2001, long before the institution of today’s marvels of data 
collection, Judge Facciola considered this fallacy in the context of a 
dispute about “backup tapes”: 
 
Using traditional search methods to locate paper records in 
a digital world presents unique problems.  In a traditional 
“paper” case, the producing party searches where she 
thinks appropriate for the documents requested under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 34.  She is aided by the fact that files are 
traditionally organized by subject or chronology . . . such as 
all the files of a particular person, independent of subject.  
Backup tapes are by their nature indiscriminate.  They 
capture all information at a given time and from a given 
server but do not catalogue it by subject matter.70 
 
                                                          
68 See supra Part II.B. 
 
69 See Charles R. Ragan, Information Governance: It’s a Duty and It’s Smart Business, 
19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 12, ¶ 3 (2013), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v19i4/article12.pdf (noting 
that “for most organizations, information volume doubles every eighteen to twenty-four 
months”). 
 
70 McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 32-33 (D.D.C. 2001). 
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[33] This analogy concerning the overall construct of data systems gave 
rise to the false premise that data can be preserved at any moment in time 
simply by taking a “snapshot” of “the computer system” at issue at the 
instant the duty to preserve attaches, thereby “freezing” in time a mirror 
image of all data existing within that system.  Take, for example, Playboy 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, a straightforward trademark infringement case 
from the 1990s.71  In that case, in light of potential data destruction, 
specifically e-mail deletion, the court appointed a “computer expert who 
specializes in the field of electronic discovery to create a ‘mirror image’” 
of the alleged infringer’s hard drive.72  The entirety of this court-ordered 
solution to counter spoliation of evidence was based on the notion that the 
defendant’s physical workstation could be copied onto a “disk,” reviewed 
for privilege by defense counsel, and that “recovered” non-privileged files 
responsive to previous discovery requests could then be printed and 
produced to plaintiff.73  While this was perhaps feasible in an era when the 
volume of data was smaller and ESI was tethered to physical devices, it 
nonetheless required the best (and most expensive) forensic preservation 
tools available. 
 
[34] Although this scenario seems downright quaint from the vantage-
point of 2014, it is a mistake to believe that a similar result can be 
achieved on larger, more technologically-advanced scale.  The idea of data 
preservation cannot be shifted simply from its moorings in the replication 
of the contents of a physical device to the replication of a “system.”  
Despite the fact that the concept of “mirror image” replication retains an 
ongoing allure for parties who think that such forensic wizardry can 
capture materials they believe an opposing party has not produced, such a 
conclusion is generally based solely on the requesting party’s subjective 
analysis of what has been produced.74  Parties often adopt this posture, 
                                                          
71 See generally Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (S.D. Cal. 1999). 
 
72 Id. at 1051, 1055. 
 
73 See id. at 1055.   
 
74 See Kickapoo Tribe of Indians of Kickapoo Reservation in Kan. v. Nemaha Brown 
Watershed Joint Dist. No. 7, 294 F.R.D. 610, 613, 618-19 (D. Kan. 2013) (declining the 
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which amounts to a way of saying: “If you just give me everything you 
have, I will find what I am looking for.”  Not only is this the very 
definition of the oft-condemned discovery fishing expedition, but it flies in 
the face of the well-accepted standard set forth in Zubulake—that the 
preservation duty does not require the preservation of, nor entitle a 
requesting party to get, all possible evidence.75 
 
[35] Consider two specific items much in the fore of e-Discovery 
commentary today: BYOD devices76 and Shadow IT.77  Both potentially 
contain discoverable data, as both are systems that exist outside of the 
company-controlled data-ecosystem, either overtly or covertly. 
Additionally, both are subject to company policies, regulations, and 
prohibitions but are fertile ground for the rogue actor/employee.78  Both 
elude any easy analogy to the “mirroring” technologies of the past.  The 
                                                                                                                                                
plaintiffs’ request for an order requiring the mirror imaging of the computers and other 
electronic devices personally owned by the defendant’s employees and former 
employees, citing both concerns about “possession, custody, and control,” and the 
significant intrusion such imaging would impose on the individuals’ privacy when 
considered against the remote likelihood of the discovery of new evidence).  
 
75 See Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 
76  Gartner defines Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) as “an alternative strategy allowing 
employees, business partners and other users to utilize a personally selected and 
purchased client device to execute enterprise applications and access data.  Typically, it 
spans smartphones and tablets, but the strategy may also be used for PCs.”  IT Glossery: 
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD), GARTNER, http://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/bring-
your-own-device-byod (last visited Feb. 10, 2014). 
 
77 Shadow IT, or “Rogue IT,” is the businessperson’s deployment of software or 
hardware that is not directly under the control of the IT department.  See Jennifer Lonoff 
Schiff, 6 Tips to Help CIOs Manage Shadow IT, CIO (Nov. 13, 2013), 
http://www.cio.com/article/743114/6_Tips_to_Help_CIOs_Manage_Shadow_IT. 
 
 
78 To what extent they are subject to these restrictions and prohibitions, at least in the 
case of BYOD devices, is, thus far, a case-by-case factual inquiry.  See Cotton v. Costco 
Wholesale Corp., No. 12-2731-JWL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103369, at *6-7 (D. Kan. 
July 24, 2013).  
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struggle a company faces when confronted with preservation and Shadow 
IT is manifest: the “company” may not know of its existence yet the 
shadow data may contain potentially discoverable information that may be 
under the possession, custody, and control of the organization.  “[T]he 
slippery slope down the life of rogue IT begins [by] downloading 
unauthorized apps[,] using Dropbox, Google Docs, or any other SaaS; the 
consequences of which are document leakages, lost business and financial 
penalties.”79  In the context of e-Discovery, Shadow IT can make it 
difficult to identify and preserve unique, relevant ESI.  Yet, a court, 
working from years of knowledge about how conventional systems can be 
preserved or forensically replicated, seeks to apply the same preservation 
and production requirements on the company’s “shadow data” once a 
party (on either side) realizes the possibility of its existence.  The very 
nature of Shadow IT, however, makes it impossible for a company to use 
the tools it has developed or has available to it for preservation of its 
official data infrastructure to rein in the parallel, unsanctioned information 
infrastructure.80 
 
[36] Practitioners’ potential pitfalls when it comes to the “easy 
preservation” assumption are not isolated to situations involving “rogue” 
elements like Shadow IT.  An ongoing risk for litigants is that the courts 
and other parties will remain unaware that some of the basic tools essential 
for electronic preservation in a specific area will not translate to a different 
or emerging technology.  Courts could potentially penalize litigants for 
failing to accomplish the impossible act of superimposing a preservation 
                                                          
79 Ben Kepes, Rogue IT, a Rogues Gallery.  Highlighting the Perils of “Shadow It”, 
FORBES (Nov. 30, 2013, 12:18 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/benkepes/2013/11/30/rogue-it-a-rogues-gallery-
highlighting-the-perils-of-shadow-it/ (quoting Winners of the harmon.ie Rogue IT Horror 
Contest Announced!, HARMON.IE, http://harmon.ie/blog/winners-harmonie-rogue-it-
horror-story-contest-announced (last visited Dec. 15, 2013)).  
 
80 See FAQ: How Does Shadow IT Complicate Enterprise Regulatory Compliance?, 
SEARCHCOMPLIANCE, http://searchcompliance.techtarget.com/guides/FAQ-How-does-
shadow-IT-complicate-enterprise-regulatory-compliance (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) 
(noting that Rogue IT is not subject to the same security controls or safeguards, making 
compliance even more difficult). 
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technique used routinely for saving one kind of data upon a different set of 
data in a manner for which it was not designed or is simply not effective.   
 
[37] In re Pradaxa Products Liability Litigation illustrates this 
problematic paradigm.81  Preservation of certain business text messages on 
employee-owned phones and employer-issued phones had become one of 
the hotly contested discovery issues in the case.82  In the district court’s 
December 2013 opinion, the court explained that no distinction could be 
made between the defendants’ duty to preserve e-mails and texts, stating 
that both mediums are electronic communications and are therefore 
subject to the same duty to maintain, regardless of differences in usage or 
durability.83  Thus, in the view of the court, the failure of the company to 
intervene and suspend “auto-delete” functions on employee phones was 
sanctionable.84  Critically absent in the court’s opinion and consideration 
is the fact that e-mail and text communication environments are 
dramatically different.85   
 
[38] In a corporate e-mail environment, deletion and retention policies 
can be set and managed by the organization at the global, systemic level.  
Today, there is rarely a need to have individual users manipulate personal 
e-mail settings to achieve the desired preservation.  On the other hand, text 
messaging is a vastly different environment.  Each mobile device may 
have multiple applications capable of sending/retrieving SMS and or 
MMS text messages.  Each mobile device has a specific messaging 
interface with the mobile device carrier.  Some may have a linkage to a 
                                                          
81 See In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2385; 3:12-md-02385-
DRH-SCW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173674, at *2-4 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2013).  
 
82 See id. at *3.  
 
83 See id. at *57-58, *62, *64.  
 
84 See id. at *63-66. 
 
85 See id. at *57-58, *61 (“[T]ext messages are electronically stored information, it does 
not matter that text messaging is a less prominent form of communication. . . .There is no 
question the defendants owed a duty to preserve this material.”). 
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corporate messaging server, such as the Blackberry Enterprise Service 
(BES), that can be configured to capture messages, but those instances of 
captures are the vast minority in practice.86  Thus, in the text message 
environment, the ability to save messages, and how many can be saved, is 
largely device- and carrier-dependent; there is no one answer and certainly 
no safe “auto-delete” switch.  The reality is that each custodian will 
necessarily undertake the preservation task with varied and potentially 
incriminating consequences for failure.87 
 
[39] Best practice guidance dictates that business organizations must 
stay on top of the legal ramifications of new data environments, systems, 
applications, and devices.  The text message versus e-mail example is but 
one illustration of the dramatic technological underpinnings that 
differentiate two technologies that have a similar use.  Even under the 
simplest paradigm of data architecture within a company where, for 
example, a company operates primarily on a physical server located at the 
company’s brick-and-mortar headquarters and has some well-defined 
contractual usage of a “cloud” server, instant gratification preservation—
either by flipping a switch, sending the right legal hold, or through 
forensic replication—is unachievable.  It is critical to have knowledge of 
what can and cannot be preserved, and how that preservation would be 
undertaken, on hand in order to effectively advocate in court and avoid the 
imposition of sanctions based upon fundamental misapprehensions of 
technology.  Regular reviews of ESI data maps and ESI systems profile 
descriptions, quarterly meetings of e-Discovery counsel (usually in-house 
e-Discovery and technical specialists, IT representatives, RIM 
                                                          
86 See Mobile Device Management for Compliance: Archiving & Compliance for 
Smartphones, GLOBAL RELAY, http://www.globalrelay.com/resources/files/Global-
Relay-Mobile-Device-Management.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) (discussing that 
customers of Global Relay’s SMS archiving service will not have to rely on systems such 
as BlackBerry Enterprise Servers to capture and archive text messages). 
  
87 For example, on December 18, 2013 a former BP engineer was convicted by a federal 
jury on one count of obstruction of justice for deleting potentially incriminating text 
messages from his cell phone.  See Michel Kunzelman, Ex-BP Engineer Convicted on 1 
Obstruction Charge, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 18, 2013, 3:23 PM), 
http://www.bigstory.ap.org/article/jury-standstill-ex-bp-engineers-trial. 
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representatives, and dedicated outside e-Discovery counsel), early 
escalation of key ESI discovery disputes to knowledgeable and able 
advocates, and the development of reasoned and evidentially-supported 
positions are critical recommendations that business organizations should 
consider. 
 
D.  Case Assumption #4: Standard Federal Rule 26(c) 
Protective Orders Automatically Provide Effective Protections 
to Address Privacy Rights and Interests. 
 
Truth: Rule 26(c) was not originally designed to address individual 
privacy rights, and certainly not with a view to global laws and 
expectations that are dramatically different from US rules and laws. 
 
[40] The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that upon a showing 
of “good cause” the court may issue an order to forbid, limit, or make 
secret from the public specified discovery.88  Such orders, termed 
“protective orders,” may be issued upon the motion of one party or 
pursuant to the stipulation of all parties to the litigation.89  Protective 
orders that limit the disclosure of trade secrets, or other information a 
business is compelled to keep private, have become more common in 
various types of litigation.  Such orders serve myriad objectives, 
including: the protection of corporate secrets; stemming dissemination of 
discoverable information from passing to other potential litigants; 
preventing embarrassment; and keeping adverse parties from releasing 
discoverable information to the public where the same may prejudice the 
potential jury pool.90  While the scope of Rule 26(c) is broad, it does not 
specifically acknowledge that a litigant may have an obligation to protect 
the privacy of third parties such as customers or employees during the 
                                                          
88 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). 
 
89 See id.  
 
90 See Jacqueline S. Guenego, Trends in Protective Orders Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(c): Why Some Cases Fumble While Others Score, 60 FORD. L. REV. 541, 
542-52 (1991). 
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course of discovery.  The sections below illustrate the emerging 
complexity of privacy considerations in a world of extensive ESI, and why 
litigants must carefully craft and deploy proper protective order provisions 
that will appropriately guard private information.  
 
1.  Common Law 
 
[41] The tort of intrusion on seclusion provides a right to privacy91 in 
most states.92  The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the tort of 
intrusion on seclusion as “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or 
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs 
or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if 
the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”93  Courts 
adopting this tort have variously operationalized it in two, three, or four 
element tests.94  In addition, other torts such as public disclosure of private 
                                                          
91 Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 900 A.2d 650, 660 (N.J. 2010) (stating “the 
common law source [of a right to privacy] is the tort of ‘intrusion on seclusion’”); see 
also Lazette v. Kulmatycki, 949 F. Supp. 2d 748, 760-61 (N.D. Ohio 2013) (discussing 
the common law source of a right to privacy as established by the tort of intrusion into 
seclusion). 
 
92 The Illinois Supreme Court recently recognized the tort in Lawlor v. North American 
Corp. of Illinois and listed the follow other states as recognizing the same claim: Alaska, 
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, 
Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia.  983 N.E.2d 414, 425 n.5 (Ill. 2012).  Other states 
have codified this tort in statute.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50 (West 2007). 
 
93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B. 
 
94 See e.g., Martin v. Guevara, 464 F. App’x 407, 410 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The elements of a 
cause of action for invasion of privacy by intrusion on seclusion are 1) the defendant 
intentionally intruded on the plaintiff's solitude, seclusion, or private affairs, and 2) the 
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”) (citing Valenzuela v. 
Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. 1993)); Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 531 (8th 
Cir.  2007) (stating the claimant “must demonstrate (1) the existence of a secret and 
private subject matter, (2) the plaintiff's right to keep that subject matter private, and (3) 
the obtainment by the defendant of information about that subject matter through 
unreasonable means”) (citing St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr. v. H.S.H., 974 S.W.2d 606, 609-10 
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facts95 or conversion of intangible property96 may be applicable in some 
jurisdictions.   
 
[42] While the legal principles underlying an individual’s privacy 
interest may be varied, in many cases courts have sought to find a balance 
between an organization’s legitimate business interests and the privacy 
interests of the individual constituent.97  Various courts have identified the 
following factors that have weighed to some extent on their determination 
of whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
electronic communication files: 
 
                                                                                                                                                
(Mo. Ct. App. 1998)); Johnson v. K mart Corp., 723 N.E.2d 1192, 1196 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2000) (recognizing the tort in the district and adopting four elements: “(1) an 
unauthorized intrusion or prying into the plaintiff's seclusion; (2) an intrusion that is 
offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person; (3) the matter upon which the intrusion 
occurs is private; and (4) the intrusion causes anguish and suffering”) (citing Melvin v. 
Burling, 490 N.E.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Ill. Ct. App. 1986)). 
 
95 See 103 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Invasion of Privacy By Public Disclosure of 
Private Facts 159 § 1 (2008). 
 
96 See, e.g., Eysoldt v. ProScan Imaging, 957 N.E.2d 780, 786 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011). 
 
97 See Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 610-611 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding that in order to 
survive a motion to dismiss a claim for invasion of privacy under Wisconsin law, the 
plaintiff had to show that “a reasonable person could have an expectation of privacy 
when visiting a celebrity performer's backstage area where the general public, of which 
[plaintiff] was a member, was not allowed”); Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 
469, 490 (Cal. 1998) (noting that intrusion on seclusion “is proven only if the plaintiff 
had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, 
conversation or data source”); Lazette v. Kulmatycki, 949 F. Supp. 2d 748, 760-61 (N.D. 
Ohio 2013) (to demonstrate an intrusion into seclusion “the affairs or concerns must be 
private to rise to be actionable as an invasion of privacy.  . . . ‘In order to establish a 
wrongful intrusion into private activities, a plaintiff must show that he or she had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area allegedly intruded’”) (quoting Moore v. 
Univ. Hosp. of Cleveland Med. Ctr., No. 1:11-CV-00508, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
131854, at *11-12 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 15, 2011) (internal citations omitted)). 
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(1) Ownership of the device upon which the communications were 
made or viewed;98 
(2) Ownership of the account with the service provider;99 
(3) Ownership of the supporting infrastructure, such as computer 
networks used to transmit the communication;100  
(4) Steps the employee took to secure the communication/information, 
such as creating a password on the device, encrypting the 
information, or deleting copies of the information;101 
(5) Communication or information made, accessed, or stored in a 
public place where it could be observed by an onlooker;102  
(6) Employer policies or notices regarding whether personal use is 
allowed and employee expectations of privacy and whether the 
employee was aware of these policies; and103 
                                                          
98 See, e.g., Sitton v. Print Direction, Inc., 312 718 S.E.2d 532, 537 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) 
(explaining that an employer's review of employee's e-mail on employee's personal 
laptop computer that employee used in conducting employer's business, even if 
“surveillance,” did not constitute such an unreasonable intrusion of employee's seclusion 
or solitude as to rise to level of invasion of privacy). 
 
99 See, e.g., Mintz v. Mark Bartelstein & Assocs., 906 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 
2012) (stating that a reasonable jury could only find that plaintiff had an expectation of 
privacy in his personal e-mail account after employer defendant hacked his personal 
account despite the fact that plaintiff used a business account for business matters and 
only forwarded e-mails from his business account to his personal one when the e-mail 
concerned personal matters such as medical issues). 
 
100 U.S. v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that a public employee 
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal computer, in part because 
“he knowingly networked his machine to the city computer for the express purpose of 
sharing files”). 
 
101 See, e.g., Mintz, 906 F. Supp. 2d at 1033 (discussing plaintiff’s use of a password on 
his personal e-mail account). 
 
102 See, e.g., Sanders v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 978 P.2d 67, 73-74 (Cal. 1999) 
(“[A]n employee may, under some circumstances, have a reasonable expectation of 
visual or aural privacy against electronic intrusion by a stranger to the workplace, despite 
the possibility that the conversations and interactions at issue could be witnessed by 
coworkers or the employer.”). 
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(7) Routine practice regarding personal use, including whether any 
employer policies were routinely enforced.104 
 
 2.  SCA & ECPA 
 
[43] The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) protects an individual’s 
right to privacy in specific electronic communications.105  Specifically, the 
SCA gives network account holders statutory privacy rights against third-
party access to information held by ISPs.106 The private right of action 
under the SCA107 establishes a civil cause of action against anyone who 
(1) accesses, (2) without authorization, (3) a facility through which an 
electronic communication service108 is provided, and (4) thereby obtains 
access to a wire or electronic communication109 (5) while it is in electronic 
                                                                                                                                                
103 See, e.g., In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(developing a four prong test: “(1) does the corporation maintain a policy banning 
personal or other objectionable use, (2) does the company monitor the use of the 
employee's computer or e-mail, (3) do third parties have a right of access to the computer 
or e-mails, and (4) did the corporation notify the employee, or was the employee aware, 
of the use and monitoring policies”). 
 
104 See, e.g., id. 
 
105 See Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and A 
Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1213-14 (2004). 
 
106 See id. at 1213. 
 
107 See 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) (2012). 
 
108 Under the statute, an “electronic communication service” is “any service which 
provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic 
communications.” § 2510(15). 
 
109 “Electronic communication” includes transfer of data by electromagnetic system that 
affects interstate or foreign commerce.  § 2510(12).  E-mail is a form of electronic 
communication.  See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“The legislative history of the ECPA [the larger act that encompasses the SCA] suggests 
that Congress wanted to protect electronic communications that are configured to be 
private, such as e-mail and private electronic bulletin boards.”); see also In re 
Application of United States, 416 F. Supp. 2d 13, 16 (D.D.C. 2006) (“[T]here can be no 
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storage.110  Courts have found that an organization violated the SCA when 
it used an employee’s password stored on company-owned hardware to 
access an employee’s private e-mail.111  Similarly, employers have been 
found liable for violating the SCA when they coerced an employee to 
grant the employer access to electronic communications that would be 
protected under the SCA.112 
 
3.  NLRA 
 
[44] The duty to bargain collectively under the National Labor 
Relations Act113 “includes a duty to provide relevant information needed 
by a labor union for the proper performance of its duties as the employees’ 
bargaining representative.”114  Nonetheless, privacy concerns may allow 
the employer to withhold certain information from the union, such as 
psychological aptitude tests,115 medical information,116 or information 
regarding strike replacements.117  
 
                                                                                                                                                
doubt that [§ 2510(12)] is broad enough to encompass e-mail communications and other 
similar signals transmitted over the Internet.”).  
 
110 “Electronic Storage” is intermediate storage incidental to the transmission of 
electronic communication and storage of that communication by the service provider for 
the purposes of backup.  § 2510(17).  
 
111 See, e.g., Lazette v. Kulmatycki, 949 F. Supp. 2d 748, 755 (N.D. Ohio 2013).  
 
112 See, e.g., Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
88702, at *8-9 (D. N.J. Sept. 25, 2009). 
 
113 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). 
 
114 Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303 (1979). 
 
115 See, e.g., id. at 320. 
 
116 See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 1981-82 NLRB Dec. (CCH) P18,892,  (1982). 
 
117 See, e.g., Chicago Tribune Co. v. NLRB, 79 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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4.  HIPAA & HITCH Act 
 
[45] The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”)118 includes a privacy rule and a security rule that cover 
medical records and payment information defined as “protected health 
information” (“PHI”) in both physical and electronic form.119  The Privacy 
Rule regulates the use and disclosure of PHI by “Covered Entities,” which 
includes health plans, health care clearinghouses and certain health care 
providers.120  The Security Rule only applies to electronic PHI and 
specifies the administrative, technical and physical safeguards that 
covered entities must implement to secure electronic PHI.121   
 
[46] Even if an organization is not a health care provider, it may acquire 
individual’s PHI acquired through other business activities where PHI is 
collected from participating individuals.  For example, a company that 
retains PHI for its employees is subject to the privacy and other safeguard 
requirements of HIPAA.   
 
[47] The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health Act (“HITECH”) augments HIPAA and imposes additional privacy 
and security provisions on the use and disclosure of electronic PHI. 122  
                                                          
118 Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 10 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., 29 
U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 26 U.S.C.). 
 
119 See generally U.S. DEP’T. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE 
HIPAAPRIVACY RULE (2003), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf 
html. 
 
120 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102, .104 (2013). 
 
121 See Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS.GOV, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/index.html (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2014). 
 
122 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH), 
Title XIII of Division A and Title IV of Division B of the American Recovery and 
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HITECH extends all of the privacy and security provisions of HIPAA to 
“Business Associates”123 of Covered Entities.124  To the extent a business 
associate holds electronic PHI, the organization is subject to the 
administrative, physical and technical safeguards imposed by HIPAA’s 
Security Rule, meaning that it will need to take reasonable steps to 
safeguard the data.125  This requirement also could extend to the BYOD 
service provider if an end-user stores any PHI at the provider through 
automatic back-up or other storage services. 
 
 
5.  Foreign Jurisdictions 
 
[48] Finally, if ESI is stored in a location outside the United States, 
laws of foreign jurisdictions, such as the European Union, may come into 
play.  The European Data Protection Framework contains many 
requirements and nuances that are outside the scope of this article.  
Nonetheless, the European Union, in contrast to the United States, 
considers personal privacy to be a fundamental right.126  As a result, the 
European Union has promulgated directives providing for heightened 
privacy protections of sensitive personal data held by corporations 
operating within its borders.  The current framework includes the Data 
                                                                                                                                                
Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
17931 et. seq.). 
 
123 Services that a business associate may provide include legal, actuarial, accounting, 
consulting, data aggregation, management, administrative, accreditation, and financial.  
45 C.F.R. § 160.103; Business Associates, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/ 
businessassociates.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2014). 
 
124 See id. 
 
125 Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 121. 
 
126 See McKay Cunningham, Privacy in the Age of the Hacker: Balancing Global Privacy 
and Data Security Law, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 643, 651 (2012). 
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Protection Directive,127 the complementary E-Privacy Directive,128 and the 
Data Retention Directive129.  In general, the Data Protection Directive 
governs the way in which an organization processes personal data.  
Member states then adopt local legislation addressing the means by which 
data controllers must protect personal information.130   
 
[49] The European Union Article 29 Working Party (the standing 
committee that addresses data protection issues) construes the definition of 
“personal data” broadly.  The Data Protection Directive defines personal 
data as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person (‘data subject’).”131  Data need not refer to a person directly in 
order for authorities to construe the data as personal; rather, it may be any 
data that allows an entity to identify an individual.  The data controller 
must comply with the key principles established by Article 6 of the Data 
Protection Directive when processing personal data.  In general, these 
include fair and lawful processing,132 collection for specified, explicit, and 
                                                          
127 See Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1995:281:0031:0050:EN:PDF 
[hereinafter Data Protection Directive]. 
 
128 See Council Directive 2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:201:0037:0047:EN:PDF; 
Council Directive2009/136, 2009 O.J. (L337) 11 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:337:0011:0036:En:PDF. 
 
129 See Council Directive 2006/24, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0054:0063:EN:PDF. 
 
130 See, e.g., Loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 d’informatique et libertes [Lqw 78-17 of 
January 6, 1978, on information technology, data files and civil liberties], JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 7, 
2004 (Fr.), amended by Law No. 2004-801 of Aug. 6, 2004, Law No. 2009-526 of May 
13, 2009, available at http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/en/Act78-17VA.pdf. 
 
131 See Data Protection Directive, supra note 127, art. 2(a), at 38. 
 
132 See id. at art. 6(1)(a), at 40.  
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legitimate purposes,133 data minimization,134  data accuracy,135 data 
retention,136 and data security.137 In addition, as a general rule, 
organizations cannot transfer personal data to a country outside the 
European Union unless that country provides an “adequate level of 
protection” for personal data.138   
 
[50] The broad discovery mandates of the United States’ legal system 
often clash with the European emphasis on privacy.  The United States 
“lack what the [European] Commission would deem an ‘adequate level’” 
of safeguards, a view that encompasses the legal system.139  As noted 
above, an organization may not transfer data to a country that is not a 
member of the European Union unless it follows one of the accepted 
                                                          
133 See id. at art. 6(1)(b). 
 
134 See id. at art. 6(1)(c). 
 
135 See id. at art. 6(1)(d). 
 
136 See Data Protection Directive, supra note 127, at art. 6(1)(e). 
 
137 See id. at art. 17(1). 
 
138 Id. at art. 25(1).  An organization can rely on one of several options to determine 
whether a country or entity within another country provides an adequate level of 
protection.  These mechanisms include: Adequacy Determination (a country provides an 
adequate level of protection for personal data (this grouping does not include the United 
States)) Safe Harbor (privacy principles established by the United States Department of 
Commerce with which an organization can comply (an organization must apply to the 
Department of Commerce for a Safe Harbor designation)); Model Clauses (contractual 
clauses to which the exporting and importing controller (or processor) can agree); 
Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs) (legally binding rules that a multinational organization 
can adopt for transfers within its environment); Derogations (limited exceptions to 
requirements for adequate data protection). 
 
139 See Stephen A. Oxman, Exemptions to the European Union Personal Data Privacy 
Directive: Will They Swallow the Directive?, 24 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 191, 199 
(2000), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol24/iss1/8/ (citing Robert M. Gellman, 
Can Privacy Be Regulated Effectively on a National Level?  Thoughts on the Possible 
Need for International Privacy Rules, 41 VILL. L. REV. 129, 158 (1996)). 
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mechanisms.140  These options do not address the situation in which 
personal information residing in the European Union may be relevant to a 
claim or defense in a court within the United States. Nonetheless, 
American courts may assume that these challenges can be managed, or are 
not decisive. 
 
[51] As the intersection of personal versus business use of devices has 
become more expansive, the preservation and collection of unique 
relevant business information has become a challenge.  The blending of 
business and personal data has undoubtedly beckoned the attention of 
member state data protection authorities.  For example, the French data 
protection authority, the Commission nationale de l’informatique et des 
libertés (CNIL), has taken an active interest in the privacy implications of 
the increased adoption of BYOD within French organizations.141  
Organizations should continue to monitor future guidance issued by the 
EU, the CNIL, and other national data protection bodies. 
 
[52] Each of the illustrative sources of privacy rights examined above 
support the proposition that a “blanket protective order” may no longer be 
enough to secure and protect privacy rights that other laws and rules 
recognize.  Best practice guidance dictates that lawyers and clients discard 
old boilerplate protective order forms in favor of new templates that 
adequately address the data at issue.142  Terms of protective orders may 
                                                          
140 See Data Protection Directive, supra note 127, at art. 25(1)-(6). 
 
141 See European Data Protection Day: Progressing Towards More Reliable and Modern 
Regulation, ASIP SANTÉ (Aug. 9, 2013), http://esante.gouv.fr/en/actus/services/rollout-
the-cps-3-health-professional-card-complete. 
 
142 See Gibbons P.C., New York Appellate Court Refuses to Amend Confidentiality Order 
to Address Runaway Data Issue, E-DISCOVERY LAW ALERT (Feb. 28, 2011), 
http://www.ediscoverylawalert.com/2011/02/articles/legal-decisions-court-rules/new-
york-appellate-court-refuses-to-amend-confidentiality-order-to-address-runaway-data-
issue/; cf. Timothy Lendino et al., Confidentiality and Protective Orders, SMITH MOORE 
LEATHERWOOD (Aug. 5 2013), http://www.smithmoorelaw.com/Confidentiality-and-
Protective-Orders-08-05-2013 (discussing generally how counsel should consider 
potential applicable issues before agreeing to a “standard, ‘on size fits all’ protective 
order”). 
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need to be far more prescriptive regarding transmission, storage, retrieval 
and deletions of data—including deletions from disaster recovery systems.  
Any data, devices, system inspections, or data recovery efforts need to 
have detailed protocols that address the protection of domestic and foreign 
privacy rights (if applicable).  In short, the dictates of procedural 
protection need to address the litigation information lifecycle from clients 
to vendors, to lawyers, to opposing parties, to courts.  The procedural 
requirements to protect information may even affect the sequencing of 
discovery to avoid, unless necessary, transgressing privacy rights. 
 
E.  Case Assumption #5:  Emerging Technologies Are Making 
It Easier to Isolate Relevant Discoverable Information and 
Decrease Preservation Burdens. 
 
Truth:  Emerging technologies make it easier to preserve data in bulk and 
in largely undifferentiated format.  Yet as the capacity for preservation 
(i.e., storage) increases, the ability to discern, retrieve, and produce 
relevant discoverable data does not increase commensurately.  In relative 
terms, it actually decreases. 
 
[53] The subset of ESI likely to be relevant to any particular litigation 
that exists within the greater whole of data under the possession, custody, 
and control of the party is often miniscule.  At the outset of discovery, 
however, most data architecture systems do not provide a reasonable 
method for identifying and preserving likely relevant data.  At best, parties 
can choose to preserve, en masse, the systems (and their contents) that are 
typically used to conduct business of the nature of the subject litigation 
during the time period deemed relevant (from the date of the triggering 
event forward).  The assumption that a party can easily discern, isolate, 
and collect the relevant discoverable information from this monolith of 
data is a persistent myth.143 
                                                          
143 In reality, the sheer volume of data that now exists and can be preserved, or is being 
preserved, is such that the data often has limited utility in an organization’s efforts to cull 
information that might be beneficial to its business operations.  As a recent commentator 
noted, “absent investment in costly search technologies capable of federated searches 
across platforms and storage containers, these volumes of information may jeopardize the 
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[54] The duty to preserve relevant discoverable information does not 
give rise to an obligation to preserve every piece of information 
conceivably related to the general subject matter of the litigation.  In 
Zubulake IV, Judge Scheindlin observed that the duty to preserve is not 
boundless, stating, “Must a corporation, upon recognizing the threat of 
litigation, preserve every shred of paper, every e-mail or electronic 
document, and every backup tape?  The answer is clearly, ‘no’.  Such a 
rule would cripple large corporations . . . that are almost always involved 
in litigation.”144 
 
[55] Implicit in Judge Scheindlin’s observation is the notion of 
proportionality in preservation.  Judge Lee Rosenthal of the Southern 
District of Texas explained the need for proportional preservation in 
Rimkis Consulting Group v. Cammarata, stating that a determination on 
whether a party had fulfilled its preservation obligations “depends on what 
is reasonable, and that in turn depends on whether what was done—or not 
done—was proportional to that case and consistent with clearly 
established applicable standards.”145 
 
[56] One challenge of proportionality is that the duty to preserve 
electronic data, and the possibility of sanctions for failure to uphold that 
duty, is tied directly to the relevancy requirements governing all discovery 
obligations under the Federal Rules of Evidence, which are determined at 
the time of trial.  If a party affirmatively limits the scope of preservation, 
and it is later revealed that the party failed to preserve or produce relevant 
data previously available to that party, the defending party is forced to 
argue a logical negative: that it could not have reasonably anticipated that 
evidence would be relevant, so even the failure to preserve it in the face of 
                                                                                                                                                
organization’s ability to retrieve valuable information efficiently such that strategic 
opportunities are lost.”  Ragan, supra note 69, at ¶ 3. 
 
144 Zublake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217 (2003). 
 
145 Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (S.D. Tex. 
2010) (emphasis omitted). 
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its later-determined relevancy was not a breach of the duty.146  The 
liability that parties may expect if left with no better defense than “we-
didn’t-realize-at-the-time” is potentially crippling.147  Moreover, as 
practitioners, we know that trial courts have little fear of being overruled 
on appeal for imposing preservation requirements that are too broad.  
Indeed, the cruelty of the situation becomes apparent when one considers 
that of the most experienced judges who has opined on ESI uses, 
Magistrate Judge James Francis of the Southern District of New York, 
remarked that the attractive concept of proportionality in preservation is 
largely elusive because it cannot easily be defended: 
 
Reasonableness and proportionality are surely good guiding 
principles for a court that is considering imposing a 
preservation order or evaluating the sufficiency of a party’s 
efforts at preservation after the fact.  Because these 
concepts are highly elastic, however, they cannot be 
assumed to create a safe harbor for a party that is obligated 
to preserve evidence but is not operating under a court-
imposed preservation order.  Proportionality is particularly 
tricky in the context of preservation.  It seems unlikely, for 
example, that a court would excuse the destruction of 
evidence merely because the monetary value of the 
anticipated litigation was low.148 
 
 
[57] Thus, the circular nature of the preservation/sanction dichotomy 
unfolds. The recitation of the limits of preservation in cases such as 
Zubulake and Rimkis is entirely without practical import unless producing 
                                                          
146 See Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218, 220. 
 
147 Cf. 5 LEWIS S. MIKE EIDSON & SEAN M. CLEARY, LITIGATING TORT CASES § 58:29, 
available at Westlaw LITGTORT § 58:29 (last updated August 2013) (“Sanctions arising 
out of a charge of electronic spoliation of evidence, even pursuant to a regular business 
practice, can be extremely harsh.” (citations omitted)). 
 
148 See Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 436 n.10 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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parties have a reasonable method for extracting relevant discoverable 
information from the haystack.   
  
[58] In short, this assumption is based on the idea that we can easily and 
accurately extract information meeting our desired criteria from the whole 
data universe available for preservation.  First, this assumes some triage 
capability in initial preservation, which often does not exist in reality.  
Absent saving “every scrap,” we must cede that there is a statistical 
likelihood that relevant discoverable data will not be preserved.  The 
greater the piece of the data pie that is not saved the larger that error 
percentage becomes.  We don’t know what we don’t know.  Second, even 
in the most well-tailored and accurately targeted (but still overly-
inclusive) preservation efforts, we do not yet have the search tools to 
guarantee the end product.   Parties and courts cite new and marvelous 
developments in the methods available for the isolation of relevant 
discoverable evidence: from basic key word searches to more 
sophisticated predictive coding and sampling to brand-specific search 
platforms that combine multiple technologies.   
 
[59] In terms of best practices developments, there is perhaps no more 
pernicious challenge than the search for a reasoned way to find what 
parties need for the fair and just resolution of a dispute without emptying 
every literal and figurative cupboard and hoping that all of the Crown’s 
horses and soldiers (and computers) can find what you need.  Today there 
are substantial market forces at work urging courts, companies, and 
litigants to deploy various software packages and systems to “efficiently” 
find the information sought.  Yet, for all of the marketing splash and 
scholarly debate, the proof of improved results and efficiencies has not 
been fully established.  We can only hope to improve those odds by 
employing increasingly advanced methodologies and technologies that 
cost more time and more money, diminishing any chance that the 
discovery process will even begin to comport with the dictates of Rule 1 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Notably, whether or not the 
parties propose extensive and sophisticated search terms or the 
deployment of extensive computer predictive analytics, courts are making 
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clear that they recognize the limits of their expertise and are starting to 
hold back from making decisions in the blind.149 
 
[60] A key takeaway from this growing technological movement is that 
parties must take control of this area.  For litigants with modest to 
significant dockets, having a comprehensive plan to approach search and 
retrieval (including various options depending on the size and complexity 
of matters) is critical to achieving courtroom and business process success 
(and budget sanity).  This may require the selection of dedicated e-
Discovery counsel (in-house and outside) to understand the company and 
the best deployment of methodologies to meet needs and engage the right 
vendors (and leveraging that understanding across cases and time).  This 
imperative is all the more important when the judicial reluctance to decide 
in a vacuum is coupled with the mantra of cooperation—courts expect that 
parties, especially medium to large scale public and private enterprises, 
should be able to reach agreements on search and retrieval processes.150  
The flip side of this expectation is the likelihood that, in the event of a 
dispute, the party who took the most reasonable positions (with credible 
support) will prevail because the court will not have the time, expertise of 
patience to wade through the weeds of complex search methodology 
negotiations. 
 
[61] Finally, while the authors believe that technology will provide 
better solutions, just as John Henry ultimately learned that the power of 
                                                          
149 See, e.g., Fort Worth Emp.’s Ret. Fund v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. 09 Civ. 3701 
(JPO) (JCF), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176384, at *15-17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2013); Kleen 
Prod. LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 10 C 5711, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139632, at 
*22 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012); United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 23-24 
(D.D.C. 2008). 
 
150 See generally The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Cooperation 
Proclamation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 331 (2009).  As of October 2012, judges in the 
following states had endorsed the Proclamation: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, New 
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
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technology is formidable,151 the most important key to success in e-
Discovery is the meaningful understanding of when technology will 
provide efficiencies, and when attorney expertise is required to guide the 
claims and defenses in the matter.  The Supreme Court’s directives 
regarding pleading from the past twenty years, which culminated most 
recently in the Twombley and Iqbal decisions, unmistakably indicate that 
litigants must articulate the foundational elements of claims (and by 
extension, defenses) in order to provide the framework for judicial 
resolution.152  Without a sound understanding of the case, a lawyer cannot 
possibly articulate what needs to be found, whether using a basic human 
linear review or the most sophisticated algorithms.  Indeed, even if she 
purchased the most effective search program ever developed, it cannot 
operate without her insight, direction and interaction.  Likewise, she 
cannot meaningfully enter into the predicate Rule 26(f) discussions with 
her adversary concerning the necessary parameters of preservation and 
discovery in a case.  And perhaps most importantly, a good argument can 
be made that she cannot competently represent her clients in the litigation.  
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
[62] While case law may provide a starting point for analysis of a 
particular e-Discovery issue, because technology is not static, reliance on 
prior decisions must be approached with restraint.  When The Sedona 
Conference Working Group 1 first met in the Fall of 2002, one of the 
prime concerns driving the formation of the group was the absence of case 
law guidance (stare decisis) on issues that were arising in the area of e-
Discovery.153   Into that void, The Sedona Principles were offered as best 
                                                          
151 SCOTT REYNOLDS NELSON, STEEL DRIVIN’ MAN: JOHN HENRY, THE UNTOLD STORY 
OF AN AMERICAN LEGEND 1-2 (2006). 
 
152 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 554-556 (2007). 
 
153 As noted in the introduction,  
 
[i]n Spring 2002, many of us who would later form the Sedona 
Conference Working Group on Electronic Document Production began 
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practice guidance, with a goal of guiding the development of legal 
standards.  
 
[63] Nearly a dozen years later, it is now patently clear that the absence 
of case law guidance will likely be a recurring reality in the area of e-
Discovery by virtue of the rapid evolution of technologies and connected 
social communication patterns that render the speed and nature of 
traditional case law guidance incapable of providing practical guidance to 
other courts, parties, and counsel.  Indeed, as the examination of the 
exemplar assumptions in this article reveals, the notion of stare decisis in 
e-Discovery is like the disconnected collarbone highlighted in Justice 
Holmes’ cat—it is no longer has utility.154  
 
[64] Embracing this reality is critically important for all participants in 
the judicial process.  For courts, it means that guidance in any given case 
should primarily be aimed at resolving the specific issue raised by the 
parties.  To the extent that broader issues can be addressed to provide 
                                                                                                                                                
to discuss ways to develop “best practices” for lawyers to follow in 
addressing electronic document production.  An industry of electronic 
discovery consultants and continuing legal education courses had 
developed, which suggested to some that all data ever generated 
electronically would be saved and made available for litigation.  Courts 
handled ripe disputes, but with few decisions reported and a smaller 
number containing applicable guidance outside the context of the 
instant facts, organizations were uncertain as to their legal obligations.  
The collapse of Enron and Arthur Andersen, and the legislative 
response to these events, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
confirmed the importance of handling electronic document production 
in a defensible manner.  It seemed doubtful to us that the normal 
development of case law would yield, in a timely manner, best 
practices for organizations to follow in the production of electronic 
documents.   
 
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES 
RECOMMENDATION & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT 
PRODUCTION 1 (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds. 2003) 
 
154 See Holmes, supra note 1, at 630. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 2 
 
47 
guidance, such guidance should be tailored to address fundamental legal 
principles untethered to the specific application of existing technologies or 
business processes.  For parties and counsel, it means that reliance on prior 
cases addressing e-Discovery issues should be undertaken with more care 
and in fewer circumstances than may be done in other aspects of the case 
law.  Citations to prior decisional law need to be carefully vetted to 
confirm reliance on stable legal principles rather than referral to 
technology-based results that are no longer valid or sustainable.  Parties 
and counsel should also continue to look for (and develop) industry 
standards and best practices guidance as better starting points to guide the 
application of rules and technologies to a given circumstance in order to 
counsel clients and advocate positions to courts.155  
 
                                                          
155 See Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffery Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil 
Litigation: Is Rule 34 up to the Task? 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 361 (2000)(“[W]hile courts 
have managed to resolve motions that raise Rule 34 questions in the context of electronic 
discovery, they have generally approached these questions in a highly fact-specific 
manner, producing few general principles to aid in the resolution of similar disputes.”). 
